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We give an exponential separation between one-way quantum and classical communication
protocols for a partial Boolean function (a variant of the Boolean Hidden Matching Problem
of Bar-Yossef et al.) Earlier such an exponential separation was known only for a relational
problem. The communication problem corresponds to a strong extractor that fails against a
small amount of quantum information about its random source. Our proof uses the Fourier
coefficients inequality of Kahn, Kalai, and Linial.
We also give a number of applications of this separation. In particular, we show that there
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not against quantum ones.
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1 Introduction
One of the main goals of quantum computing is to exhibit problems where quantum computers are
much faster (or otherwise better) than classical computers. Preferably exponentially better. The
most famous example, Shor’s efficient quantum factoring algorithm [Sho97], constitutes a separation
only if one is willing to believe that efficient factoring is impossible on a classical computer—proving
this would, of course, imply P6=NP. One of the few areas where one can establish unconditional
exponential separations is communication complexity.
Communication complexity is a central model of computation, first defined by Yao [Yao79],
that has found applications in many areas [KN97]. In this model, two parties, Alice with input x
and Bob with input y, collaborate to solve some computational problem that depends on both x
and y. Their goal is to do this with minimal communication. The problem to be solved could be a
function f(x, y) or some relational problem where for each x and y, several outputs are valid. The
protocols could be interactive (two-way), in which case Alice and Bob take turns sending messages
to each other; one-way, in which case Alice sends a single message to Bob who then determines the
output; or simultaneous, where Alice and Bob each pass one message to a third party (the referee)
who determines the output. The bounded-error communication complexity of the problem is the
worst-case communication of the best protocol that gives (for every input x and y) a correct output
with probability at least 1− ε, for some fixed constant ε ∈ [0, 1/2), usually ε = 1/3.
Allowing the players to use quantum resources can reduce the communication complexity sig-
nificantly. Examples of problems where quantum communication gives exponential savings were
given by Buhrman, Cleve, and Wigderson for one-way and interactive protocols with zero error
probability [BCW98]; by Raz for bounded-error interactive protocols [Raz99]; and by Buhrman,
Cleve, Watrous, and de Wolf for bounded-error simultaneous protocols [BCWW01]. The first two
problems are partial Boolean functions, while the third one is a total Boolean function. How-
ever, the latter separation does not hold in the presence of public coins.1 Bar-Yossef, Jayram,
and Kerenidis [BJK04] showed an exponential separation for one-way protocols and simultaneous
protocols with public coins, but they only achieved this for a relational problem, called the Hidden
Matching Problem (HMP). This problem can be solved efficiently by one quantum message of log n
qubits, while classical one-way protocols need to send nearly
√
n bits to solve it. Nevertheless,
Boolean functions are much more natural objects than relations both in the model of communica-
tion complexity and in the cryptographic settings that we consider later in this paper. Bar-Yossef
et al. stated a Boolean version of their problem (a partial Boolean function) and conjectured that
the same quantum-classical gap holds for this problem as well.
1.1 Exponential separation for a variant of Boolean Hidden Matching
In this paper we prove an exponential quantum-classical one-way communication gap for a variant of
the Boolean Hidden Matching Problem of [BJK04]. Let us first state a non-Boolean communication
problem. Suppose Alice has an n-bit string x, and Bob has a sequence M of αn disjoint pairs
(i1, j1), (i2, j2), . . . , (iαn, jαn) ∈ [n]2, for some parameter α ∈ (0, 1/2]. This M may be viewed as a
partial matching on the graph whose vertices are the n bits x1, . . . , xn. We call this an α-matching.
1In fact, whether there exists a superpolynomial separation for a total Boolean function in the presence of public
coins is one of the main open questions in the area of quantum communication complexity.
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Together, x and M induce an αn-bit string z defined by the parities of the αn edges:
z = z(x,M) = (xi1 ⊕ xj1), (xi2 ⊕ xj2), . . . , (xiαn ⊕ xjαn).
Suppose Bob wants to learn some information about z. Let x ∈ {0, 1}n be uniformly distributed,
and M be uniform over the set Mαn of all α-matchings. Note that for any fixed M , a uniform
distribution on x induces a uniform distribution on z. Hence Bob (knowing M but not x) knows
nothing about z: from his perspective it is uniformly distributed. But now suppose Alice can send
Bob a short message. How much can Bob learn about z, given that message and M?
The situation is very different depending on whether the message is quantum or classical.
Modifying the protocol of [BJK04], it is easy to show that a short quantum message of about
log(n)/2α qubits allows Bob to learn a bit at a random position in the string z. This already puts a
lower bound of one on the total variation distance between Bob’s distribution on z and the uniform
αn-bit distribution.
What about a short classical message? Using the Birthday Paradox, one can show that if Alice
sends Bob about
√
n/α bits of x, then with constant probability there will be one edge (iℓ, jℓ) for
which Bob receives both bits xiℓ and xjℓ . Since zℓ = xiℓ ⊕ xjℓ, this gives Bob a bit of information
about z. Our key theorem says that this classical upper bound is essentially optimal: if Alice sends
much fewer bits, then from Bob’s perspective the string z will be close to uniformly distributed, so
he does not even know one bit of z.
In order to be able to state this precisely, suppose Alice is deterministic and sends c bits of
communication. Then her message partitions the set of 2n x’s into 2c sets, one for each message. A
typical message will correspond to a set A of about 2n−c x’s. Given this message, Bob knows the
random variable X is drawn uniformly from this set A and he knows M , which is his input. Hence
his knowledge of the random variable Z = z(X,M) is fully described by the distribution
pM (z) = Pr[Z = z | given M and Alice’s message] = |{x ∈ A | z(x,M) = z}||A| .
Our main technical result says that if the communication c is much less than
√
n/α bits, then for
a typical message and averaged over all matchings M , this distribution is very close to uniform in
total variation distance. In other words: most of the time, Bob knows essentially nothing about z.
Theorem 1. Let x be uniformly distributed over a set A ⊆ {0, 1}n of size |A| ≥ 2n−c for some c ≥ 1,
and let M be uniformly distributed over the set Mαn of all α-matchings, for some α ∈ (0, 1/4].
There exists a universal constant γ > 0 (independent of n, c, and α), such that for all ε > 0: if
c ≤ γε
√
n/α then
EM [‖ pM − U ‖tvd] ≤ ε.
We prove Theorem 1 using the Fourier coefficients inequality of Kahn, Kalai, and Linial [KKL88],
which is a special case of the Bonami-Beckner inequality [Bon70, Bec75]. We remark that Fourier
analysis has been previously used in communication complexity by Raz [Raz95] and Klauck [Kla01].
This result allows us to turn the above communication problem into a partial Boolean function,
as follows. Again we give Alice input x ∈ {0, 1}n, while Bob now receives two inputs: a partial
matching M as before, and an αn-bit string w. The promise on the input is that w is either
equal to z = z(x,M), or to its complement z (i.e. z with all bits flipped). The goal is to find
out which of these two possibilities is the case. We call this communication problem αPM, for
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“α-Partial Matching”. As mentioned before, Alice can allow Bob to learn a random bit of z with
high probability by sending him an O(log(n)/α)-qubit message. Knowing one bit zℓ of z suffices
to compute the Boolean function: just compare zℓ with wℓ. In contrast, if Alice sends Bob much
less than
√
n/α classical bits, then Bob still knows essentially nothing about z. In particular, he
cannot decide whether w = z or w = z! This gives the following separation result for the classical
and quantum one-way communication complexities (with error probability fixed to 1/3, say):
Theorem 2. Let α ∈ (0, 1/4]. The classical bounded-error one-way communication complexity
of the α-Partial Matching problem is R1(αPM) = Θ(
√
n/α), while the quantum bounded-error
one-way complexity is Q1(αPM) = O(log(n)/α)
Fixing α to 1/4, we obtain the promised exponential quantum-classical separation for one-way
communication complexity of O(log n) qubits vs Ω(
√
n) classical bits.
Remarks. The earlier conference version of this paper [GKK+07] had two different communi-
cation problems, establishing an exponential one-way separation for both of them in quite different
ways. The present paper unifies these two approaches to something substantially simpler.
The original Boolean Hidden Matching Problem stated in [BJK04] is our αPM with α = 1/2
(i.e. M is a perfect matching). Theorem 2, on the other hand, assumes α ≤ 1/4 for technical
reasons. By doing the analysis in Section 3 a bit more carefully, we can prove Theorem 2 for every
α that is bounded away from 1/2. Note that if α = 1/2, then the parity of z = z(x,M) equals
the parity of x, so by communicating the parity of x in one bit, Alice can give Bob one bit of
information about z. The conference version of this paper showed that one can prove a separation
for the case whereM is a perfect matching if the promise is that w is “close” to z or its complement
(instead of being equal to z or its complement). One can think of w in this case as a “noisy” version
of z = z(x,M) (or its complement), while the w of our current version can be thought of as starting
from a perfect matching M ′, and then “erasing” some of the n bits of the string z(x,M ′) to get
the αn-bit string z (or its complement).
The separation given here can be modified to a separation in the simultaneous message passing
model, between the models of classical communication with shared entanglement and classical
communication with shared randomness. Earlier, such a separation was known only for a relational
problem [BJK04, GKRW06], not for a Boolean function.
1.2 Application: privacy amplification
Randomness extractors extract almost uniform randomness from an imperfect (i.e. non-uniform)
source of randomness X with the help of an independent uniform seed Y . With a bit of extra work
(see Section 4), Theorem 1 actually implies that our function z : {0, 1}n ×Mαn → {0, 1}αn is an
extractor:
IfX ∈ {0, 1}n is a random variable with min-entropy at least n−γε√n/α (i.e. maxx Pr[X =
x] ≤ 2−(n−γε
√
n/α)) and Y is a random variable uniformly distributed over Mαn, then
the random variable Z := z(X,Y ) is ε-close to the uniform distribution on {0, 1}αn.
It is in fact a strong extractor: the pair (Y,Z) is ε-close to the uniform distribution on Mαn ×
{0, 1}αn.2 Informally, this says that if there is a lot of uncertainty about X, then Z will be close
2Note that EM
ˆ
‖ pM − U ‖tvd
˜
= ‖ (Y,Z)− U ‖tvd, where ‘U ’ on left and right is uniform over different domains.
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to uniform even if Y is known.3
Extractors have found numerous applications in computer science, in particular in complexity
theory (see e.g. [Sha02] and the references therein) and cryptography. One important cryptographic
application is that of privacy amplification, which was introduced in [BBR88, ILL89]. In this setting,
Alice and Bob start with a shared random variable X about which the adversary has some partial
information m(X) and their goal is to generate a secret key Z about which the adversary has very
little information. They can achieve this by communicating an independent uniform seed Y over
a public authenticated channel, and using a strong extractor to generate the key Z(X,Y ). Using
the extractor we define here, the resulting αn-bit key Z = z(X,Y ) is ε-close to uniform if the
adversary’s view of X has min-entropy at least n − γε
√
n/α. Thus, assuming a certain upper
bound on the number of bits of m(X), the key Z is ε-secure despite the fact that the adversary
can learn Y completely by tapping the public channel. Notice, however, that this classically-secure
privacy amplification scheme is insecure against a quantum adversary: if the adversary stores a
uniform superposition of the bits of x, then when later Y is revealed, she can learn a random bit of
Z with good probability. Thus we have an example of a privacy amplification scheme that is secure
against classical adversaries with o(
√
n) bits of storage, but insecure against quantum adversaries
with much less quantum storage.
This dependence of the security on whether the adversary has quantum or classical memory
is quite surprising, particularly in light of the following two facts. First, privacy amplification
based on two-universal hashing provides exactly the same security against classical and quantum
adversaries. The length of the key that can be extracted is given by the min-entropy both in
the classical ([BBR88, ILL89]) and the quantum case ([KMR05, RK05], [Ren05, Ch. 5]). Second,
Ko¨nig and Terhal [KT06] have recently shown that for protocols that extract just one bit, the
level of security against a classical and a quantum adversary (with the same information bound) is
comparable.
1.3 Application: key-expansion in the bounded-storage model
In privacy amplification, we can ensure that the adversary has much uncertainty about the random
variable X by assuming that he has only bounded storage. The idea of basing cryptography on
storage-limitations of the adversary was introduced by Maurer [Mau92] with the aim of implement-
ing information-theoretically secure key-expansion. In this setting, a large random variable X is
publicly but only temporarily available. Alice and Bob use a shared secret key Y to extract an
additional key Z = Z(X,Y ) from X, in such a way that the adversary has only limited information
about the pair (Y,Z). “Limited information” means that the distribution on (Y,Z) is ε-close to uni-
form even when conditioned on the information about X that the adversary stored. Thus Alice and
Bob have expanded their shared secret key from Y to (Y,Z). Aumann, Ding, and Rabin [ADR02]
were the first to prove a bounded-storage scheme secure, and essentially tight constructions have
subsequently been found [DM04, Lu04, Vad04].
It is an important open question whether any of these constructions remain secure if the ad-
3It should be noted that the parameters of our extractor are quite bad, as far as these things go. First, the uniform
input seed Y takes about αn log n bits to describe, which is more than the αn bits that the extractor outputs; in
a good extractor, we want the seed length to be much shorter than the output length. Second, our assumed lower
bound on the initial min-entropy is quite stringent. Finally, the distance from uniform can be made polynomially
small in n (by putting an n − n1/2−η lower bound on the min-entropy of X) but not exponentially small, which is
definitely a drawback in cryptographic contexts. Still, this extractor suffices for our purposes here.
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versary is allowed to store quantum information. One may even conjecture that a bounded-storage
protocol secure against classical adversaries with a certain amount of memory, should be roughly as
secure against quantum adversaries with roughly the same memory bound. After all, Holevo’s the-
orem [Hol73] tells us that k qubits cannot contain more information than k classical bits. However,
a key-expansion scheme based on our extractor refutes this conjecture. The scheme is essentially
the same as the above privacy amplification scheme: Alice and Bob will compute Z := z(X,Y ) by
applying our extractor to X and Y . If the adversary’s memory is bounded by γε
√
n/α bits then Z
will be ε-close to uniform from the adversary’s perspective. On the other hand, O(log n) qubits of
storage suffice to learn one or more bits of information about Z, given Y , which shows that (Y,Z)
is not good as a key against a quantum adversary. Thus we have an example of a key-expansion
scheme that is secure against classical adversaries with o(
√
n) bits of storage, but insecure against
quantum adversaries even with exponentially less quantum storage.
1.4 Application: a separation in the streaming model
In the streaming model of computation, the input is given as a stream of bits and the algorithm
is supposed to compute or approximate some function of the input, having only space of size S
available. See for instance [AMS99, Mut05]. There is a well-established connection between one-
way communication complexity and the streaming model: if we view the input as consisting of two
consecutive parts x and y, then the content of the memory after x has been processed, together
with y, contains enough information to compute f(x, y). Hence, a space-S streaming algorithm
for f implies a one-way protocol for f of communication S with the same success probability.
The classical lower bound for our Boolean communication complexity problem, together with the
observation that our quantum protocol can be implemented in the streaming model, implies a
separation between the quantum and classical streaming model. Namely, there is a partial Boolean
function f that can be computed in the streaming model with small error probability using quantum
space of O(log n) qubits, but requires Ω(
√
n) bits if the space is classical.
Le Gall [Gal06] constructed a problem that can be solved in the streaming model using O(log n)
qubits of space, while any classical algorithm needs Ω(n1/3) classical bits. His log n-vs-n1/3 separa-
tion is a bit smaller than our log n-vs-
√
n, but his separation is for a total Boolean function while
ours is only partial (i.e. requires some promise on the input). Le Gall’s result predates ours, though
we only learned about it after finishing the conference version of our paper. We remark also that
Le Gall’s separation holds only in the streaming model variant where the bits arrive in order, while
ours holds in the more general model where we allow the different pieces of the input to arrive in any
order. The algorithm starts out with a log n-qubit superposition 1√
n
∑n
i=1 |i〉. Whenever a bit xi
streams by in the input, the algorithm applies a unitary transformation that maps |i〉 7→ (−1)xi |i〉.
Whenever an edge (iℓ, jℓ) streams by, the algorithm measures with operators E1 = |iℓ〉〈iℓ|+ |jℓ〉〈jℓ|
and E0 = I − E1. And whenever a bit (iℓ, jℓ, wℓ) streams by (we need to know to which edge
the bit wℓ corresponds), then the algorithm maps |i〉 7→ (−1)wℓ |i〉 where i = min(iℓ, jℓ). At the
end, with probability 2α the algorithm is left with a state 1√
2
((−1)xiℓ⊕wℓ|iℓ〉+(−1)xjℓ |jℓ〉) for some
edge (iℓ, jℓ) ∈ M . The algorithm can learn the function value xiℓ ⊕ xjℓ ⊕ wℓ from this by a final
measurement.
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1.5 Application: limits on classical simulation of quantum one-way protocols
A final application is in the context of simulating one-way quantum communication protocols by
one-way classical protocols. As noted by Aaronson [Aar06, Section 5], our Theorem 1 implies
that his general simulation of bounded-error one-way quantum protocols by deterministic one-way
protocols
D1(f) = O(mQ1(f) logQ1(f)),
is tight up to a polylogarithmic factor. Here m is the length of Bob’s input. This simulation works
for any partial Boolean function f . Taking f to be our αPM for α = 1/4, one can show that
D1(f) = Θ(n), m = Θ(n log n), and Q1(f) = O(log n).
It also implies that his simulation of quantum bounded-error one-way protocols by classical
bounded-error one-way protocols
R1(f) = O(mQ1(f)),
cannot be considerably improved. In particular, the product on the right cannot be replaced by the
sum: if we take f = αPM with α = 1/
√
n, then by Theorem 2 we have R1(f) ≈ n3/4,m ≈ √n log n,
and Q1(f) = O(
√
n log n).
2 The problem and its quantum and classical upper bounds
We assume basic knowledge of quantum computation [NC00] and (quantum) communication com-
plexity [KN97, Wol02].
Before giving the definition of our variant of the Boolean Hidden Matching Problem, we fix
some notation. Part of Bob’s input will be a sequence M of αn disjoint edges (i1, j1), . . . , (iαn, jαn)
over [n], which we call an α-matching. We use Mαn to denote the set of all such matchings. If
α = 1/2 then the matching is perfect, if α < 1/2 then the matching is partial. We can view M as
an αn × n matrix over GF (2), where the ℓ-th row has exactly two 1s, at positions iℓ and jℓ. Let
x ∈ {0, 1}n. Then the matrix-vector product Mx is an αn-bit string z = z1, . . . , zℓ, . . . zαn where
zℓ = xiℓ ⊕ xjℓ . Using this notation, we define the following α-Partial Matching (αPM) problem,
whose one-way communication complexity we will study.
Alice: x ∈ {0, 1}n
Bob: an α-matching M and a string w ∈ {0, 1}αn
Promise on the input: there is a bit b such that w =Mx⊕ bαn (equivalently, w = z or w = z)
Function value: b
Actually, most of our analysis will not be concerned with Bob’s second input w. Rather, we will
show that given only a short message about x, Bob will know essentially nothing about z = Mx.
Note that to compute b, it suffices that Bob learns one bit zℓ of the string z, since b = zℓ⊕wℓ. We
will first give quantum and classical upper bounds on the message length needed for this.
Quantum upper bound: Suppose Alice sends a uniform superposition of her bits to Bob:
|ψ〉 = 1√
n
n∑
i=1
(−1)xi |i〉.
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Bob completes his αn edges to a perfect matching in an arbitrary way, and measures with the
corresponding set of n/2 2-dimensional projectors. With probability 2α he will get one of the edges
(iℓ, jℓ) of his input M . The state then collapses to
1√
2
((−1)xiℓ |iℓ〉+ (−1)xjℓ |jℓ〉) ,
from which Bob can obtain the bit zℓ = xiℓ ⊕ xjℓ by measuring in the corresponding |±〉-basis.
Note that this protocol has so-called “zero-sided error”: Bob knows when he didn’t learn any bit
zℓ. If Bob is given O(k/α) copies of |ψ〉, then with high probability (at least while k ≪ αn) he can
learn k distinct bits of z.
Remark. This protocol can be modified to a protocol in the simultaneous message passing
model in a standard way, first suggested by Buhrman (see [GKRW06]). Alice and Bob share the
maximally entangled state 1√
n
∑
i |i, i〉. Alice implements the transformation |i〉 → (−1)xi |i〉 on her
half. Bob performs the measurement with his projectors on his half. If he gets one of the edges
of his input, he sends the resulting (iℓ, jℓ) and wℓ to the referee. Now Alice and Bob perform a
Hadamard transform on their halves, measure and send the result to the referee, who has enough
information to reconstruct zℓ.
Classical upper bound: We sketch an O(
√
n/α) classical upper bound. Suppose Alice uni-
formly picks a subset of d ≈
√
n/α bits of x to send to Bob. By the Birthday Paradox, with high
probability Bob will have both endpoints of at least one of his αn edges and so he can compute
a bit of z (and hence the function value b) with good probability. In this protocol Alice would
need to send about d log n bits to Bob, since she needs to describe the d indices as well as their
bitvalues. However, by Newman’s Theorem [New91], Alice can actually restrict her random choice
to picking one out of O(n) possible d-bit subsets, instead of one out of all
(n
d
)
possible subsets.
Hence d + O(log n) bits of communication suffice. This matches our lower bound up to constant
factors.
3 Main proof
In this section we prove our main technical result (Theorem 1), which shows that Bob knows hardly
anything about the string z =Mx unless Alice sends him a long message.
3.1 Preliminaries
We begin by providing a few standard definitions from Fourier analysis on the Boolean cube. For
functions f, g : {0, 1}n → R we define their inner product and ℓ2-norm by
〈f, g〉 = 1
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
f(x)g(x) , ‖ f ‖22 = 〈f, f〉 =
1
2n
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|f(x)|2.
The Fourier transform of f is a function f̂ : {0, 1}n → R defined by
f̂(s) = 〈f, χs〉 = 1
2n
∑
y∈{0,1}n
f(y)χs(y),
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where χs : {0, 1}n → R is the character χs(y) = (−1)y·s with “·” being the scalar product; f̂(s) is
the Fourier coefficient of f corresponding to s. We have the following relation between f and f̂ :
f =
∑
s∈{0,1}n
f̂(s)χs.
We will use two tools in our analysis, Parseval’s identity and the KKL lemma.
Lemma 3 (Parseval). For every function f : {0, 1}n → R we have ‖ f ‖22 =
∑
s∈{0,1}n
f̂(s)2.
Note in particular that if f is an arbitrary probability distribution on {0, 1}n and U is the
uniform distribution on {0, 1}n, then f̂(0n) = Û(0n) = 1/2n and Û(s) = 0 for nonzero s, hence
‖ f − U ‖22 =
∑
s∈{0,1}n
(f̂(s)− Û(s))2 =
∑
s∈{0,1}n\{0n}
f̂(s)2. (1)
Lemma 4 ([KKL88]). Let f be a function f : {0, 1}n → {−1, 0, 1}. Let A = {x | f(x) 6= 0}, and
let |s| denote the Hamming weight of s ∈ {0, 1}n. Then for every δ ∈ [0, 1] we have
∑
s∈{0,1}n
δ|s|f̂(s)2 ≤
( |A|
2n
) 2
1+δ
.
We also need the following combinatorial lemma about uniformly chosen matchings.
Lemma 5. Let v ∈ {0, 1}n. If |v| = k for even k, then
Pr
M
[∃ s ∈ {0, 1}αns.t. MT s = v] =
(αn
k/2
)(
n
k
) ,
where the probability is taken uniformly over all α-matchings M .
Proof. We can assume without loss of generality that v = 1k0n−k. We will compute the fraction
of matchings M for which there exists such an s. The total number of matchings M of αn edges
is n!/(2αn(αn)!(n − 2αn)!). This can be seen as follows: pick a permutation of n, view the first
αn pairs as αn edges, and ignore the ordering within each edge, the ordering of the αn edges,
and the ordering of the last n − 2αn vertices. Note that ∃ s s.t. MT s = v iff M has exactly k/2
edges in [k] and αn − k/2 edges in [n]\[k]. The number of ways to pick k/2 edges in [k] (i.e. a
perfect matching) is k!/(2k/2(k/2)!). The number of ways to pick αn − k/2 edges in [n] − [k] is
(n− k)!/(2αn−k/2(αn − k/2)!(n − 2αn)!). Hence the probability in the lemma equals
k!/(2k/2(k/2)!) · (n− k)!/(2αn−k/2(αn − k/2)!(n − 2αn)!)
n!/(2αn(αn)!(n − 2αn)!) =
(αn
k/2
)(
n
k
) .
This probability is exponentially small in k if α < 1/2, but it equals 1 if α = 1/2 and v = 1n.
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Total variation distance: For probability distributions p and q on the same finite set S, let
‖ p− q ‖tvd =
∑
i∈S
|p(i)− q(i)| (2)
denote their total variation distance. This distance is 0 if p = q, it is 2 if p and q have support on
disjoint sets, and between 0 and 2 otherwise. Suppose we want to distinguish p from q: given only
one sample we want to decide whether this sample came from p or from q. It is well known that
the best success probability with which we can solve this task is 1/2 + ‖ p− q ‖tvd/4, so the total
variation distance determines completely how well we can distinguish p and q.
3.2 The proof of Theorem 1
In order to prove Theorem 1, consider any set A ⊆ {0, 1}n with |A| ≥ 2n−c and let f : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1} be its characteristic function (i.e. f(x) = 1 iff x ∈ A). Let ε > 0, α ∈ (0, 1/4], and
1 ≤ c ≤ γε
√
n/α for some γ to be determined later.
With x uniformly distributed over A, we can write down Bob’s induced distribution on z as
pM (z) =
|{x ∈ A |Mx = z}|
|A| .
We want to show that pM is close to uniform, for most M . By Eq. (1), we can achieve this by
bounding the Fourier coefficients of pM . These are closely related to the Fourier coefficients of f :
p̂M (s) =
1
2αn
∑
z∈{0,1}αn
pM(z)(−1)z·s
=
1
|A|2αn (|{x ∈ A | (Mx) · s = 0}| − |{x ∈ A | (Mx) · s = 1}|)
=
1
|A|2αn
(|{x ∈ A | x · (MT s) = 0}| − |{x ∈ A | x · (MT s) = 1}|)
=
1
|A|2αn
∑
x∈{0,1}n
f(x)(−1)x·(MT s)
=
2n
|A|2αn · f̂(M
T s). (3)
Note that the Hamming weight of v =MT s ∈ {0, 1}n is twice the Hamming weight of s ∈ {0, 1}αn.
Using KKL, we get the following bound on the level sets of the Fourier transform of f :
Lemma 6. For every k ∈ {1, . . . , 4c} we have 2
2n
|A|2
∑
v:|v|=k
f̂(v)2 ≤
(
4
√
2c
k
)k
.
Proof. By the KKL inequality (Lemma 4), for every δ ∈ [0, 1] we have
22n
|A|2
∑
v:|v|=k
f̂(v)2 ≤ 2
2n
|A|2
1
δk
( |A|
2n
)2/(1+δ)
=
1
δk
(
2n
|A|
)2δ/(1+δ)
≤ 1
δk
(
2n
|A|
)2δ
≤ 2
2δc
δk
.
Plugging in δ = k/4c (which is in [0, 1] by our assumption on the value of k) gives the lemma.
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We bound the expected squared total variation distance between pM and U as follows:
EM [‖ pM − U ‖2tvd] ≤ 22αn EM
[
‖ pM − U ‖22
]
= 22αn EM
 ∑
s∈{0,1}αn\{0αn}
p̂M(s)
2

=
22n
|A|2 EM
 ∑
s∈{0,1}αn\{0αn}
f̂(MT s)2

where we used, respectively, the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, Eq. (1), and Eq. (3). Note that for
each v ∈ {0, 1}n, there is at most one s ∈ {0, 1}αn for which MT s = v (and the only s that makes
MT s = 0n, is s = 0αn). This allows us to change the expectation over M into a probability and
use Lemma 5:
=
22n
|A|2 EM
 ∑
v∈{0,1}n\{0n}
|{s ∈ {0, 1}αn |MT s = v}| · f̂(v)2

=
22n
|A|2
∑
v∈{0,1}n\{0n}
Pr
M
[∃ s ∈ {0, 1}αns.t. MT s = v] · f̂(v)2
=
22n
|A|2
2αn∑
even k=2
(αn
k/2
)(n
k
) ∑
v:|v|=k
f̂(v)2.
We first upper bound the part of this sum with k < 4c. Applying Lemma 6 for each k, using the
standard estimates (n/k)k ≤ (nk) ≤ (en/k)k, and our upper bound c ≤ γε√n/α, we get:
22n
|A|2
4c−2∑
even k=2
(
αn
k/2
)(n
k
) ∑
v:|v|=k
f̂(v)2 ≤
4c−2∑
even k=2
(2eαn/k)k/2
(n/k)k
(
4
√
2c
k
)k
≤
4c−2∑
even k=2
(
64eγ2ε2
k
)k/2
.
Picking γ a sufficiently small constant, this is at most ε2/2 (note that the sum starts at k = 2).
In order to bound the part of the sum with k ≥ 4c, note that the function g(k) := (αnk/2)/(nk) is
decreasing for the range of even k up to 2αn (which is ≤ n/2 because α ≤ 1/4):
g(k − 2)
g(k)
=
(
αn
k/2−1
)
/
(
n
k−2
)(αn
k/2
)
/
(n
k
) = (n − k + 2)(n − k + 1)k/2
(αn − k/2 + 1)(k − 1)k =
(n− k + 2)(n − k + 1)
(2αn − k + 2)(k − 1) ≥
n− k + 1
k − 1 ≥ 1.
We also have
∑
v∈{0,1}n
f̂(v)2 =
|A|
2n
by Parseval (Lemma 3), and
2n
|A| ≤ 2
c by assumption. Hence
22n
|A|2
2αn∑
even k=4c
g(k)
∑
v:|v|=k
f̂(v)2 ≤ 2cg(4c) ≤
(
8
√
2eαc
n
)2c
≤
(
8
√
2eγε
√
α
n
)2c
≤ ε2/2,
where in the last step we used α/n ≤ 1 and c ≥ 1, and picked γ a sufficiently small constant.
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Hence we have shown EM [‖ pM − U ‖2tvd] ≤ ε2. By Jensen’s inequality we have
EM [‖ pM − U ‖tvd] ≤
√
EM [‖ pM − U ‖2tvd] ≤ ε.
This concludes the proof of
Theorem 1. Let x be uniformly distributed over a set A ⊆ {0, 1}n of size |A| ≥ 2n−c for some c ≥ 1,
and let M be uniformly distributed over the set Mαn of all α-matchings, for some α ∈ (0, 1/4].
There exists a universal constant γ > 0 (independent of n, c, and α), such that for all ε > 0: if
c ≤ γε
√
n/α then
EM [‖ pM − U ‖tvd] ≤ ε.
The ε2 upper bound on EM [‖ pM − U ‖2tvd] is essentially tight. This can be seen in the commu-
nication setting as follows. With probability Ω(ε2) over the choice ofM , at least one edge ofM will
have both endpoints in the first c = ε
√
n/α bits. Then if Alice just sends the first c bits of x to Bob,
she gives him a bit of z. This makes ‖ pM − U ‖tvd at least 1, hence EM [‖ pM − U ‖2tvd] = Ω(ε2).
3.3 The proof of Theorem 2
Our Theorem 2, stated in the introduction, easily follows from Theorem 1. By the Yao principle
[Yao77], it suffices to analyze deterministic protocols under some “hard” input distribution. Our
input distribution will be uniform over x ∈ {0, 1}n and M ∈ Mαn. The inputs x and M together
determine the αn-bit string z = Mx. To complete the input distribution, with probability 1/2 we
set w = z and with probability 1/2 we set w to z’s complement z.
Fix ε > 0 to a small constant, say 1/1000. Let c = γε
√
n/α, and consider any classical
deterministic protocol that communicates at most C = c − log(1/ε) bits. This protocol partitions
the set of 2n x’s into 2C sets A1, . . . , A2C , one for each possible message. On average, these sets
have size 2n−C . Moreover, by a simple counting argument, at most a 2−ℓ-fraction of all x ∈ {0, 1}n
can sit in sets of size ≤ 2n−C−ℓ. Hence with probability at least 1− ε, the message that Alice sends
corresponds to a set A ⊆ {0, 1}n of size at least 2n−C−log(1/ε) = 2n−c. In that case, by Theorem 1
and Markov’s inequality, for at least a (1 − √ε)-fraction of all M , the random variable Z = MX
(with X uniformly distributed over A) is
√
ε-close to the uniform distribution U . Given w, Bob
needs to decide whether w = Z or w = Z. In other words, he is given one sample w, and needs
to decide whether it came from distribution Z or Z. As we mentioned after Eq. (2), he can only
do this if the distributions of Z and Z have large total variation distance. But by the triangle
inequality
‖ Z − Z ‖tvd ≤ ‖ Z − U ‖tvd + ‖ Z − U ‖tvd = 2‖ Z − U ‖tvd ≤ 2
√
ε.
Hence Bob’s advantage over randomly guessing the function value will be at most ε (for the unlikely
event that A is very small) plus
√
ε (for the unlikely event thatM is such thatMX is more than
√
ε
away from uniform) plus
√
ε/2 (for the advantage over random guessing when ‖ Z − U ‖ ≤ √ε). To
sum up: if the communication is much less than
√
n/α bits, then Bob cannot decide the function
value with probability significantly better than 1/2.
12
4 The extractor-interpretation of our construction
So far, we have proved that if the n-bit string X is uniformly distributed over a set A with
|A| ≥ 2n−c (i.e., a flat distribution on A), and Y is uniformly distributed over all α-matchings,
then (Y,Z(X,Y )) is close to uniform. In order to conclude the result about extractors mentioned
in Section 1.2, we need to prove the same result in the more general situation when X has min-
entropy greater than n− c (instead of just being uniform on a set of size at least 2n−c). However,
a result by Chor and Goldreich [CG88, Lemma 5] based on the fact that any distribution can be
thought of as a convex combination of flat distributions, shows that the second statement follows
from the first: flat distributions are the “worst distributions” for extractors.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we presented an extractor that is reasonably good when some small amount of classical
information is known about the random source X (technically: Hmin(X) ≥ n − O(
√
n/α)), but
that fails miserably if even a very small (logarithmic) amount of quantum information is known
about X. We presented five applications of this:
1. An exponential quantum-classical separation for one-way communication complexity.
2. A classically-secure privacy amplification scheme that is insecure against a quantum adversary.
3. A key-expansion scheme that is secure against memory-bounded classical adversaries, but not
against quantum adversaries.
4. An exponential quantum-classical separation in the streaming model of computation.
5. The near-optimality of Aaronson’s classical simulations of quantum one-way protocols.
These applications all have the same flavor: they give examples where quantum memory is much
more powerful than classical memory. This contrasts for instance with the results about privacy
amplification based on two-universal hashing [KMR05, RK05], where quantum memory is not
significantly more powerful than classical memory.
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